Abstract. We argue for a compositional semantics grounded in a strongly typed ontology that reflects our commonsense view of the world and the way we talk about it in ordinary language. Assuming the existence of such a structure, we show that the semantics of various natural language phenomena may become nearly trivial.
Introduction
If the main business of semantics is to explain how linguistic constructs relate to the world, then semantic analysis of natural language text is, indirectly, an attempt at uncovering the semiotic ontology of commonsense knowledge, and particularly the background knowledge that seems to be implicit in all that we say in our everyday discourse. While this intimate relationship between language and the world is generally accepted, semantics (in all its paradigms) has traditionally proceeded in one direction: by first stipulating an assumed set of ontological commitments followed by some machinery that is supposed to, somehow, model meanings in terms of that stipulated structure of reality.
With the gross mismatch between the trivial ontological commitments of our semantic formalisms and the reality of the world these formalisms purport to represent, it is not surprising therefore that challenges in the semantics of natural language are rampant. However, as correctly observed in [7] , semantics could become nearly trivial if it was grounded in an ontological structure that is, "isomorphic to the way we talk about the world". The obvious question however is 'how does one arrive at this ontological structure that implicitly underlies all that we say in everyday discourse?' One plausible answer is the (seemingly circular) suggestion that the semantic analysis of natural language should itself be used to uncover this structure. In this regard we strongly agree with [4] who states:
What this suggests, and correctly so, in our opinion, is that in our effort to understand the complex and intimate relationship between ordinary language and everyday commonsense knowledge, one could, as also suggested in [2] , "use language as a tool for uncovering the semiotic ontology of commonsense" since ordinary language is the best known theory we have of everyday knowledge.
To avoid this seeming circularity (in wanting this ontological structure that would trivialize semantics; while at the same time suggesting that semantic analysis should itself be used as a guide to uncovering this ontological structure), we could start performing semantic analysis from the ground up, assuming a minimal (almost a trivial and basic) ontology, building up the ontology as we go guided by the results of the semantic analysis. The advantages of this approach are: (i) the ontology thus constructed as a result of this process would not be invented, as is the case in most approaches to ontology (e.g., [5] , [8] and [13] ), but would instead be discovered from what is in fact implicitly assumed in our use of language in everyday discourse; (ii) the semantics of several natural language phenomena should as a result become trivial, since the semantic analysis was itself the source of the underlying knowledge structures (in a sense, the semantics would have been done before we even started!)
In this paper we suggest exactly such an approach. In particular, in the rest of the paper we (i) argue that semantics must be grounded in a much richer ontological structure, one that reflects our commonsense view of the world and the way we talk about it in ordinary language; (ii) it will be demonstrated that in a logic 'embedded' with commonsense metaphysics the semantics of various natural language phenomena could become 'nearly' trivial; and (iii) we finally suggest some steps towards discovering (as opposed to inventing) the ontological structure that seems to implicitly underlie all that we say in ordinary language.
Semantics with Ontological Content
We begin by making a case for a semantics that is grounded in a strongly typed ontological structure that is isomorphic to our commonsense view of reality. In doing so, our ontological commitments will initially be minimal. In particular, we assume the existence of a subsumption hierarchy of a number of general categories such as animal, substance, entity, artifact, event, etc., and where the fact that an object of type human is also an entity, for example, is expressed as human entity . We shall use x ( :: ) animal to state that x is an object of type animal, and Articulate x ( :: ) human to state that the property Articulate is true of some object x, an object that must be of type human (since 'articulate' is a property that is ordinarily said of humans). We write x P x ( :: )( ( )) ∃ t when the property P is true of some object x of type t; 1 x P x ( :: )( ( )) ∃ t when P is true of a unique object of type t; and a x P x ( :: )( ( )) ∃ t when the property P is true of some object x of type t, an object that only conceptually (or abstractly) exists -i.e., an object that need not physically exist. Furthermore, we assume 
As an initial example, consider the steps involved in the interpretation of 'sheba is hungry', where it will be assumed that ( ) animal entity and that Hungry is a property that applies to (or makes sense of) objects that are of type animal:
sheba is hungry 
Thus, 'sheba is hungry' states that there is a unique object named sheba, which must be an object of type animal, and such that sheba is hungry. Type unification will not always be as straightforward, as in general there could be more than two types associated with a variable in a single scope. Consider for example the interpretation of 'sheba is a young artist', where Young is assumed to be a property that applies to (or makes sense of) physical objects; and where it is assumed that Artist is a property that is ordinarily said of objects that are of type human:
sheba is a young artist
A pair of type unifications, must now occur: ( ( )) • • entity human physical , resulting in human. The final interpretation is thus given as follows:
In the final analysis, therefore, 'sheba is a young artist' is interpreted as follows: there is a unique object named sheba, an object that must be of type human, and such that sheba is Artist and Young. It should be noted here that not recognizing the ontological difference between human and Artist (namely, that what ontologically exist are objects of type human, and not artists, and that Artist is a mere property that may or may not apply to objects of type human) has traditionally led to ontologies rampant with multiple inheritance. Note, further, that in contrast with human, which is a firstintension ontological concept (see [3] for a formal discussion on this issue), Artist and Young are considered to be second-intension logical concepts, namely properties that may or may not be true of first-intension (ontological) concepts. Moreover, and unlike first-intension ontological concepts (such as human), logical concepts such as Artist are assumed to be defined by virtue of logical expressions, such as
, where the exact nature of ϕ might very well be susceptible to temporal, cultural, and other contextual factors, depending on what, at a certain point in time, a certain community considers an Artist to be. That is, while the properties of being an Artist and Young that x exhibits are accidental (as well as temporal, cultural-dependent, etc.), the fact that some x is human (and thus an animal, etc.) is not 1 .
More on Type Unification
Thus far we performed simple type unifications involving types that are in a subsumption relationship. For example, we assumed ( ) • = human entity human , since ( ) human entity . Quite often, however, it is not subsumption but some other relationship that exists between the different types associated with a variable, and a typical example is the case of nominal compounds. Consider the following:
From the standpoint of commonsense, the reference to a book review should imply the existence of a book, whereas the reference to a book proposal should be considered to be a reference to a proposal of some book, a book that might not (yet) actually exist. That is, 1 In a recent argument Against Fantology [12] it was noted that too much attention has been paid to the false doctrine that much can be discovered about the ontological structure of reality by predication in first-order logic. In particular, it is argued in [12] that the use of standard predication in first-order logic in representing the meanings of 'John is a human' and 'John is tall', for example, completely ignores the different ontological categories implicit in each utterance. While we agree with this observation, we believe that our approach to a semantics grounded in an a rich ontological structure that is supposed to reflect our commonsense reality, does solve this problem without introducing ad-hoc relations to the formalism, as example (4) and subsequent examples in this paper demonstrate. First-order logic (and Frege, for that matter), are therefore not necessarily the villains, and the "predicates do not represent" slogan is perhaps appropriate, but it seems only when predicates are devoid of any ontological content. 
It would seem therefore that type unification fails in the interpretation of some phrase that does not seem to be plausible from the standpoint of commonsense 2 .
From Abstract to Actual Existence
What we have been doing thus far can be summarized as follows: we have embedded commonsense into our semantics by annotating every quantified variable referred to in some predicate P with an ontological category that P applies to (or makes sense of), as per our everyday use of ordinary language. In this section it will be demonstrated how this mechanism, along with the notion of type unification, can explain how certain abstract entities that initially can only be assumed to conceptually exist, are, in an appropriate context, reduced to concrete spatio-temporal entities.
Recall that our intention in associating types with quantified variables, as, for example, in Articulate x ( :: ) human , was to reflect our commonsense understanding of how the property Articulate is used in our everyday discourse, namely that Articulate is ordinarily said of objects that are of type human. What of a property such as Imminent, then? Undoubtedly, saying some object e is Imminent only makes sense in ordinary language when e is some event, which we have been expressing as Imminent e ( :: ) event . But there is obviously more that we can assume of e. In particular, imminent is said in ordinary language of some e when e is an event that has 
That is, saying 'john attended the seminar' is saying there is a specific human named j, a specific seminar e (that actually exists) such that j attended e. On the other hand, consider now the interpretation of the sentence in (14) . 
That is, there is a specific human (named john) that has planned a specific trip, a trip that was Lengthy. It should be noted here that the trip in (16) was finally considered to be an existing event due to other information contained in the same sentence. In general, however, this information can be contained in a larger discourse. For example, in interpreting 'John planned the trip. It was lengthy' the resolution of 'it' would force a retraction of the types inferred in processing 'John planned the trip', as the information that follows will 'bring down' the aforementioned trip from abstract to actual existence. This subject is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, but readers interested in the computational details of such processes are referred to [14] .
On an Intensional Verbs and Dot (.) Objects
Consider the following sentences and their corresponding translation into standard first-order logic:
john found a unicorn
Note that x Elephant x ( )( ( )) ∃ can be inferred in both cases, although it is clear that 'john sought a unicorn' should not entail the existence of a unicorn. In addressing this problem, [9] suggested a solution that in effect treats 'seek' as an intensional verb that has more or less the meaning of `tries to find', using the tools of a higher-order intensional logic. In addition to unnecessary complication of the logical form, however, we believe that this is, at best, a partial solution since the problem in our opinion is not necessarily in the verb seek, nor in the reference to unicorns. That is, painting, imagining, etc. of a unicorn (or an elephant, for that matter) should not entail the existence of a unicorn (nor the existence of an elephant). To illustrate further, let us first assume the following: 
That is, we are assuming that it always makes sense to speak of a human that painted some painting, and of some human that found some entity. Consider now the interpretation in (22), where it was assumed that Large is a property that applies to (or makes sense of) objects that are of type physical. 
Note that what we now have is a quantified variable, e, that is supposed to be an object of type elephant, an object that is described by a property, where it is considered to be an object of type physical, and an object that is in a relation in which it is considered to be a painting. 
In Asher and Pustejovsky (2005) it is argued that 'book' in this context must have what is called a dot type, which is a complex structure that in a sense carries within it the semantic types associated with various senses of 'book'. For instance, it is argued that 'book' in (25) carries the `informational content' sense (when it is being read) as well as the `physical object' sense (when it is being burned). Elaborate machinery is then introduced to 'pick out' the right sense in the right context, and all in a welltyped compositional logic.
But this approach presupposes that one can enumerate, a priori, all possible uses of the word `book' in ordinary language 6 . Moreover, this approach does not seem to provide a solution for the problem posed by example (24), since there does not seem to be an obvious reason why a complex dot type for 'elephant' should contain a representational sense, although it is an object that can be painted. To see how this problem is dealt with in our approach, consider the following: 
That is, we are assuming here that it always makes sense to speak of a human that read some content, and of a human that burned some physical object. Consider now the following:
john read a book Throughout this paper we have tried to demonstrate that a number of challenges in the semantics of natural language can be easily tackled if semantics is grounded in a strongly-typed ontology that reflects our commonsense view of the world and the way we talk about it in ordinary language. Our ultimate goal, however, is the systematic discovery of this ontological structure, and, as also argued in [2] , [4] and [11] , it is the systematic investigation of how ordinary language is used in everyday discourse that will help us discover (as opposed to invent) the ontological structure that seems to underlie all what we say in our everyday discourse. Recall, for example, our suggestion of how a nominal compound such as 'a book review' is interpreted:
Note that this analysis itself seems to shed some light on the nature of the ontological categories under consideration. For example, (31) seems to be an instance of a more generic template that can adequately represent the compositional meaning of a number of similar nominal compounds, as illustrated in (a) below.
(a)
Similarly, as suggested in (b) above, it seems that the semantic analysis of a nominal compound such as 'brick house', for example, suggests that a number of nominal compounds can be semantically analyzed according to the following template: The general strategy we are advocating can therefore be summarized as follows: (i) we can start our semantic analysis by assuming a set of ontological categories that are embedded in the appropriate properties and relations (based on our use of ordinary language); (ii) further semantic analysis of some non-trivial phenomena (such as nominal compounds, intensional verbs, metonymy, etc.) should help us put some structure on the ontological categories assumed in step (i); and (iii) this additional structure is then iteratively used to repeat the entire process until, presumably, the nature of the ontological structure that seems to be implicit in everything we say on ordinary language is well understood.
Concluding Remarks
The thesis presented in this paper is the following: assuming the existence of an ontological structure that reflects our commonsense view of the world and the way we talk about in ordinary language would make the semantics of various natural language phenomena nearly trivial. Although we could not, for lack of space, fully demonstrate the utility of our approach, recent results we have obtained suggest an adequate treatment of a number of phenomena, such as the semantics of nominal compounds, lexical ambiguity, and the resolution of quantifier scope ambiguities, to name a few. More importantly, it seems that a gradual imbedding of commonsense metaphysics in our semantic formalism is itself what will help us discover the nature of the ontological structure that seems to underlie all that we say in our every discourse.
